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Introduction
This case arises from an action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with economic relations, and civil
conspiracy. Plaintiff is a board certified neurosurgeon and member of several medical
societies including the American Association of Neurological Surgeons; Congress of
Neurological Surgeons; Rocky Mountain Neurological Society; Utah Association of
Neurological Surgeons; Utah State Medical Association; and the American Medical
Association. Dr. Levitt has been the recipient of several honors and awards including the
2014 Top Ten Neurosurgeons Utah-Vitals and Patients' Choice Award Physician for the
years 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014. Prior to the actions of Defendants that gave rise to this
<dJ

case, Dr. Levitt enjoyed an exemplary professional reputation among her peers.
Dr. Levitt has had surgical privileges at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center

VP

("SLRMC") under a contract embodied in the Medical Staff Bylaws from 2002 to the
present. Dr. Levitt held the position of Chief of Surgery at SLRMC from 2006 until 2010.
However, beginning in late 2011 and culminating in February and March of 2012,
Defendants took actions that resulted in the breach of that contract and its covenant of
good faith and fair dealing by summarily suspending Dr. Levitt for 28 days, shrouding

~

the reasons for the suspension in a conspiracy of secrecy, and ultimately denying her the
fair hearing required by the bylaws. Denying the fair hearing denied her the opportunity
to clear her good name and preserve her professional reputation. It also denied her the
opportunity even to know the basis for her suspension.
3
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Defendants'/Appellees' defense was that they were immune from suit under both
state and federal law. However, the immunity could be rebutted by a showing of bad

~

faith or malice.
From the beginning of this case, Defendants have asserted that virtually every
document that would shed any light on the reasons for Dr. Levitt's summary suspension
or that would shed any further light on the nature, quality and timing of communication
between the parties was privileged and that they were immune from suit. The only
documents provided to Plaintiff were a handful of documents deemed by Defendants not
to be privileged and a "privilege log" with extremely limited descriptions of the
documents, their authors, recipients and vague references to their subject matter. In
ruling on these assertions the district court stated that Dr. Levitt could designate
documents from the privilege log for in camera review so the court could determine if
they were in fact privileged or should be discoverable in the context of the issue in this
case. Dr. Levitt never got that chance to view the documents or even to set forth which
documents the court should review, because the court made its summary judgment ruling
based on proffers and affidavits without the aid of the documents themselves.
The question on this appeal is whether, on motion for summary judgment, the
district court erred by deciding disputed issues of fact, and the inferences to be drawn
from those facts, in favor of the moving parties (Defendants). The district court erred by
taking each incident or action of the Defendant alleged by Dr. Levitt one at a time, in
isolation, and erroneously deciding that each of them standing alone was not evidence of
bad faith. Dr. Levitt's contention is that bad faith can be inferred from the totality of the
4
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circumstances regarding the conduct of the Defendants toward her. Their conduct began
with their initial conspiracy of silence with regard to the reasons for a limited,
conditional, short-term renewal of her privileges. It continued by extending the
conspiracy of silence regarding the reasons for her summary suspension. Their conduct
culminated with their outright denial of her request for the fair hearing required by the
bylaws. Defendants claimed that the proctoring plan that they required Dr. Levitt to
complete was a bargained for alternative to a fair hearing and thus there was no breach of
the bylaws. Dr. Levitt asserts that the fair hearing is the only way to safeguard a doctor's
professional reputation when faced with an adverse action, and thus the only way to show
good faith in an otherwise secretive process. She contends that denial of the fair hearing
is, in and of itself, tantamount to bad faith, especially when coupled with numerous other
missteps in communication, including drafting documents and delaying their delivery to
Dr. Levitt, continually refusing to discuss the issues with her, and treating her like a
pariah.
The district court erred when it failed to view the facts, and all inferences to be
drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to Dr. Levitt, the non-moving party.
The district court erred when it summarized that there was "no evidence" of bad faith on
the part of Defendants. Finally the district court erred when it ruled that in the absence of
bad faith Defendants were entitled to statutory immunity and granted the Defendants
summary judgment on all of Dr. Levitt's claims.

5
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The Court should reverse summary judgment and remand the case ordering the
district court to finish discovery of the alleged privileged documents and conduct a trial
on the merits.

Statement of the Issue
Issue: Whether summary judgment was appropriate where there were genuine
disputed issues of material fact and the facts and inferences to be drawn from them were
not viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, Dr. Levitt.

Standard of Review: This appeal requires the Court to examine the district
court's legal conclusions for correctness. Summary judgment is only appropriate where
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 70 P .3d
904, 909 (Utah 2003). The Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Dr. Levitt, the nonmoving party. Id. at
907. If, after review of the record, it appears that there is a material factual issue, the
Court must reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 909.

Preservation: This issue is preserved. [R.976- 977.]

6
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Statement of the Case 1
Plaintiff Jodie K. Levitt, M.D. is a duly licensed physician who has been licensed
in the State of Utah since 2002. Dr. Levitt is a neurosurgeon who has practiced her
specialty full-time since 1996. Dr. Levitt is board certified and is a member of several
medical societies including the American Association of Neurological Surgeons;
Congress of Neurological Surgeons; Rocky Mountain Neurosurgical Society; Utah
Association of Neurological Surgeons; Utah State Medical Association; and the
American Medical Association. Dr. Levitt has been the recipient of several honors and
awards including 2014 Top Ten Neurosurgeons Utah-Vitals, and Patients' Choice Award
Physician for the years 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014. Dr. Levitt was chief of neurosurgery
at the Guthrie Clinic from 1998 to 2002 when she relocated to Salt Lake City, Utah and
SLRMC. Prior to the actions of Defendants complained of hereinafter, Dr. Levitt
enjoyed an exemplary professional reputation among her peers. [R.3] During all relevant
Cj

time periods, Dr. Levitt had active staff membership with full surgical privileges at
SLRMC. Dr. Levitt held a position of Chief of Surgery at SLRMC from 2006 until 2010.
She has also had, and continues to have, a private practice in neurosurgery in Salt Lake
City since 2007. [R.3.]
In October 2009 Dr. Levitt was hospitalized for depression. This hospitalization
was fully disclosed to relevant decision makers at SLRMC including, but not limited to,
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jeff Frandsen in 2009. Thereafter Jeff Frandsen

~

Because Dr. Levitt was the nonmoving party against whom summary judgment was
granted, she presents the facts in the light most favorable to her. [R.823.]; Orvis v.
Johnson, 177 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008).
1

7
~
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disclosed Plaintifrs hospitalization to, inter alia, Defendant Dr. Wanda Updike, Chief of
Staff; Bill Southwick, Chief Nursing Officer; and Defendant, Dr. Alan Davis, the Chief
of Staff. [R. 3-4.]
In September of 2011 Dr. Levitt applied for renewal of privileges at SLRMC. On
the advice of her therapists and psychiatrist, Dr. Levitt did not disclose her 2009
hospitalization on her September 2011 application for renewal of privileges because
SLRMC and IASIS management (including SLRMC'S MEC committee) were already
aware of the hospitalization in 2009. 2 Indeed, the application itself allowed that Dr.
Levitt could supplement her application by informing the CEO (who already knew of the
hospitalization). The attestation section of the application reads in part: "I have the
responsibility to keep this application current by informing the facility, through the Chief
Executive Officer, of any changes in the areas of inquiry contained herein." This led Dr.
Levitt to believe that informing the CEO of her hospitalization was the functional
equivalent of including the information on the application, while still protecting her
privacy. This was particularly so where, as here, Dr. Levitt was not "impaired" and was
not a threat to health care in any sense of the word following her hospitalization. Indeed,
at no time did IASIS or SLRMC ever assert or accuse Dr. Levitt of being "impaired."
[R.4.]
Standard renewals of privileges at SLRMC were for two year terms. On or
about December 29, 2011 Dr. Levitt received a letter that was dated November 23, 2011

As stated above, in spite of the hospitalization Dr. Levitt remained Chief of Surgery for
SLRMC and IASIS in 2009 and 2010. [R. 3]

2
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granting conditional approval of her renewal/reappointment for six months, retroactive to
September 29, 2011. Its stated reason for the shorter-term "conditional reappointment"
was that Dr. Levitt had "several peer reviews pending."

The letter also requested

"further clarification on [her] hospitalization in the last five years and medications that
[she] might be taking that may affect either [her] clinical judgment or motor skills." The
reappointment was made subject to "the [Medical Staff] Bylaws, Rules and Regulations,
and Policies of the Hospital and Medical Staff in force during the term of [her]
appointment." [R. 4-5.]
This letter dated November 23, 2011, but not received until December 29, 2011,
was the only communication Dr. Levitt had received since she had submitted her
application for renewal of privileges in September, 2011. This was a criticism of Dr.
Levitt's professional standing and is the touchstone example of the malicious and
vexatious nature of the conduct exhibited by Dr. Wanda Updike, Dr. Alan Davis and
others as well as IASIS and SLRMC. This bad faith conduct by all Defendants
commencing on or about December 29, 2011, which continues to date, 3 is the reason Dr.
Levitt has been forced to seek judicial relief. [R. 5.] Furthermore, this letter dated
November 23, 2011 and not received until December 29, 2011 was the first notice Dr.

~

Surgeons at SLRMC have block time so that they can schedule surgeries without having
to consult the O.R. in advance each time they schedule a patient for surgery. Dr. Levitt
has been trying to get block time restored to her since 2012 and even after the summary
judgment ruling in this case her block time has not been restored. This is a continuing
example of the malicious, bad faith treatment Dr. Levitt has endured at SLRMC.
Furthermore, Dr. Levitt's suspension is still her record. A Fair Hearing could have
removed the suspension from her record.
3

~

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Levitt received that she had "several peer reviews pending." Yet there was no
information as to the nature of the reviews nor the reasons therefor. [R.5.]
Dr. Levitt made repeated attempts to get clarification from SLRMC
decisionmakers, including the individual Defendants and their administrative staff, as to
why her reappointment was "conditional." All Defendants failed and intentionally
refused to provide Dr. Levitt any information in breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws. At
one point she was told she needed to wait until after the new year when decision makers
returned from the holidays. [R. 5-6.]
While Dr. Levitt was awaiting clarification she obtained a copy of a letter from her
treating psychiatrist and resubmitted the opinion dated November 7, 2009 supporting her
continued competence and which did not demonstrate any impairment at any relevant
time. Dr. Levitt also obtained a second opinion from an outside psychiatrist, Dr. Robert
Strong, who opined that Dr. Levitt was at all times competent and not impaired in 2009
forward. Dr. Levitt provided that second opinion to SLRMC decision makers, who
continued to fail and intentionally refused to provide Dr. Levitt with the necessary
information~ This intentional activity of all Defendants continues to date, and was
malicious, unprofessional, and in breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws. [R.6.]
After the new year Dr. Levitt made repeated requests, both verbally and through
email, for information as to the reason for the "conditional reappointment" and
continuing review. But her requests were rejected and/or ignored. [R.7.]
On or about February 10, 2012, Bill Southwick, Chief Nursing Officer, asked Dr.
Levitt if she had received a "certified letter." Dr. Levitt answered in the negative and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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~

immediately went to hospital administration to request a copy of this letter. She
ultimately received a copy of a letter dated January 30, 2012, some eleven days earlier,
which alleged on its face that it had been sent Certified Mail, return receipt requested.
The mailed letter was not received by Dr. Levitt until almost the end of February, 2012.
[R.7.] The letter was from the Credentials Committee Chair, Dr. Richard Nielson, and
requested written responses by March 1, 2012. The letter requested responses to three
different issues that were based, at least in part, on misinformation stated in the letter as
the premise for Dr. Levitt's responses. Dr. Levitt was unsuccessful at getting anyone
@

among Defendants to address the intentional misinformation contained in the letter. [R.7.]
Dr. Levitt immediately called Dr. Updike, who referred her to Dr. Davis. Dr.
Levitt spoke to CEO, Jeff Frandsen, who stated that he could not see or discuss any of the

@

information that allegedly called for review. Again, CEO, Jeff Frandsen, in the insanity
of the conspiracy to hurt and damage Dr. Levitt, referred Dr. Levitt back to Dr. Davis,
GJ)

who refused to provide information; indeed, refused to even talk to Dr. Levitt. [R.8.]
This unprofessional, bad faith, and malicious behavior, caused Dr. Levitt great emotional
distress. [R.8.]
This January 30, 2012 correspondence from Dr. Nielsen, pretextually and for no
good faith reason(s), purported to accuse Dr. Levitt of errors and omissions by not listing
her 2009 hospitalization for depression and went on, pretextually with no good faith
reason(s), to require Dr. Levitt to list her hospitalization for depression in her
reapplication for privileges when the decision makers at IASIS and SLRMC knew of the
2009 hospitalization, including CEO Jeff Frandsen, CNO Bill Southwick, Chief of Staff
11
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Dr. Wanda Updike and incoming Chief of Staff Dr. Alan Davis. Defendants, and each of
them, had known of Dr. Levitt's hospitalization for over three years ... indeed, Dr. Levitt
continued as Chief of Surgery after they knew of her hospitalization. [R.21.]
The January 30, 2012 Correspondence from Dr. Nielsen, stated, in part:

Gv

Even though you have disclosed information to the CEO, this information
needs to be documented in your reappointment application in order for the
Credentials Committee to have consistent and current information [which
the Credentials Committee had, as admitted by Dr. Richard Nielsen]. The
CEO is not a member of the Credentials Committee. PLEASE CORRECT
THE APPLICATION BY MARCH 1, 2012 AND SUBMIT IT TO THE
MEDICAL STAFF OFFICE (Michelle Judy).
This quoted portion of the pretextual correspondence from Dr. Nielsen, received
by Dr. Levitt on February 10, 2012, flies in the face of the attestation provision in the
application for privileges which Dr. Levitt submitted in September, 2011, the specifically

~

states that the application may be supplemented by informing the CEO. [R.8-9.]
The January 30, 2012 letter also requested that Dr. Levitt submit protocols for
handling CSF (cerebral spinal fluid) leaks and for preventing wrong site surgeries.
[R.1010]
On February 14, 2012 Dr. Levitt submitted her responses in writing to address the
issues set forth in the January 30, 2012 letter. [R.9.]
Also on February 14, 2012, Dr. Levitt was called in to meet with Jeff Frandsen,
~

Dr. Updike, and Dr. Davis. Inexplicably, Dr. Levitt's privileges at SLRMC were
wrongfully suspended for 28 days on February 14, 2012. The letter included a signature
line asking for Dr. Levitt's agreement. She never signed the letter, nor did she agree to a
proctorship in lieu of a Fair Hearing. [R.1014-15.] During the first 14 days of the
12
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suspension, Dr. Levitt was not allowed to use the hospital, including any operating
rooms. In the ensuing 14 days, she was wrongfully required to complete seven proctored
surgeries or she would be reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (access to
information in the NPDB is used to make licensing, credentialing, privileging or
employment decisions in health care facilities). [R.10.]
During the days that followed her suspension Dr. Levitt made numerous attempts
to get answers to the substance of the complaints against her. She also requested
permission, given the short time frame, to do some of the proctored cases at other
~

facilities so that she would not be derailed by lack of operating room availability. The
efforts by Dr. Levitt to obtain information about her wrongful suspension of privileges at
SLRMC crashed into a conspiratorial, malicious, "wall of silence" by all Defendants.
Permission to utilize other facilities to complete the wrongfully required proctored cases
(in light of the short time frame that Dr. Levitt was required to complete the same) was

<@

denied. This malicious and bad faith behavior of Defendants in denying Dr. Levitt
permission to utilize other facilities of IASIS to perform the seven proctored surgeries
was a material breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws; was, and could only be, done for the
sole purpose of hurting Dr. Levitt's career. [R.10.]
On February 15, 2012 Dr. Levitt sent an email to Jeff Frandsen requesting answers
to her questions. Mr. Frandsen refused to answer her questions, referring her instead,
again, to Dr. Davis. Then on February 17, 2012 Dr. Levitt sent separate letters to Dr.
Davis and Dr. Updike requesting to meet to discuss the situation. Both requests were
denied. [R.11]
13
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On or about February 24, 2012 Dr. Levitt was allowed by Jeff Frandsen to see a
cursory list of the cases giving rise to the suspension. She sent a letter asking for removal
from the list of one patient upon whom Dr. Levitt had not operated. She received no
response. [R.11]
On February 25, 2012 Dr. Levitt met with the proctor Dr. Yonemura. She later
received a call from Dr. Davis indicating that she could not start performing proctored
surgeries on the 15th day of her suspension as she had been led to believe she would be
allowed to do. The reason stated was that "It [ was]too early," without any clarification.
Dr. Davies claimed there was missing information WHEN TIIERE WAS NO MISSING
INFORMATION because it had already been submitted to Michelle Judy. Moreover,
the so-called "missing" information, according to Dr. Nielsen's January 30, 2012 letter,
was not due until March 1, 2012. This further reduced the her time for completing the
seen proctored surgeries to one week. [R.11.]
Pursuant to her earlier request to use other facilities to complete her proctored
surgeries, Dr. Levitt received permission from CEO, Jeff Frandsen, to use other facilities
and did, in fact, perform two proctored cases at Lakeview Hospital. Upon being
informed of these two proctored cases being performed at the IASIS Lakeview Hospital
by Dr. Levitt, Dr. Davis inexplicably and maliciously denied the inclusion of them among
the seven required proctored surgeries. Thus Dr. Levitt was required to perform a total of
nine proctored surgeries in the shortened time frame to satisfy the demands made upon
her by all Defendants. [R.12.]

14
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This "summary suspension" was an adverse action under the Medical Staff
Bylaws that Dr. Levitt's reappointment was expressly made subject to by the letter dated
November 23, 2011. Under those same Medical Staff Bylaws, Dr. Levitt was entitled to
a notice from the hospital that she had a right to a "Fair Hearing" to resolve the issue and
to refute the malicious, wanton and reckless accusations made against her. [R.12.] Once
requested, she has an absolute right to the Fair Hearing to clear her name.
On February 28, 2012 Dr. Levitt sent a letter to the MEC requesting a Fair
Hearing as provided in the Medical Staff Bylaws. This request was summarily, and
maliciously denied by Dr. Davis. [R.12]
On March 2, 2012 Dr. Levitt made a request of Dr. Davis to see and discuss the
alleged cases that had been reviewed which resulted in her suspension. Dr. Davis
responded by saying, "I am not going to talk to you about your cases." [R.12-13.]
On March 16, 2012 Dr. Levitt received a second six-month "conditional
reappointment" by email from Dr. Davis. Finally, sometime after March 16, 2012, Dr.
Levitt received the cursory list of the "cases" that had been reviewed. But to date, Dr.
Davis, Dr. Updike and SLRMC administration have refused to discuss the peer review
Gj

cases, even without patient identifying information. Dr. Levitt still has not been given
any clear reasons for her suspension, or any opportunity to clear her name and
professional reputation. [R.13-14.] Her suspension is still on her record.
Dr. Levitt filed her Complaint on February 8, 2016 alleging breach of contract,
~

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with economic
relations, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. [R.1-24.] On
15
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September 20, 2017 Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [R.12791304.] which was heard by the district court on December 11, 2017. [R.781.] On

~

December 28, 2017 the district court signed and entered its Order on Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings dismissing Plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Claims for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith, and
tortious interference remained. [R.957-58.]
~

From as early as June 23, 2017 Defendants have asserted that each and every
document that would shed light on the issues in this case is privileged under Rule
26(b)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Care Review Statute, Utah Code
Ann. §26-25-3 and the Peer Review Privilege §78B-3-419. [R.1258-68.] Dr. Levitt's
contention throughout this case has been that a physician's only protection from the
possibility of unfair and malicious attacks on her professional competence is the "Fair
Hearing" provisions of the Medical Staff Bylaws. [R.13-15, 983-994, 1004-05.] Had the
Defendants granted Dr. Levitt's request for a Fair Hearing and given her the chance to
defend her professional reputation, it would be reasonable and in furtherance of the goals
of the Care Review Statute to allow the privileges and immunities to stand. But absent

4lll

the Fair Hearing, allowing the blanket privilege and immunity denies Dr. Levitt the
protections that the Bylaws were designed to provide.
~

On July 12, 2017 the district court held a telephone conference on the issue of
privilege based on Defendants' Motion to Classify and Defendants' Statement of
Discovery Issues. [R.224.] The court ordered as follows: "the Motion is DENIED
without prejudice, and that discovery shall proceed, and io ihe extent Defendants contend
16
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that responsive or relevant documents are protected by any claim of privilege or are
@

entitled to any protection, Defendants shall compile a log of all such documents. The
Court will then entertain any motion to exclude documents which Defendants maintain
are protected by any privilege." Defendants' drafted a proposed Order including this
language and emailed it to Plaintiffs counsel on July 18 2018. However, the Order was
never submitted to the court for signing and entry.
On November 20, 2017 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time for
Discovery [R.658-64.] and a Statement of Discovery Issues [R.674-77.] regarding

~

allegedly privileged documents. The hearing was ultimately scheduled for February 7,
2018, the same day as the hearing for Summary Judgment discussed below. [R.1024-27,
1055.] 4
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 20, 2017 [R.823883.] arguing, for purposes of this appeal, that Defendants were immune from suit under

@

Utah's Health Care Providers Immunity from Liability Act and the federal Healthcare
Quality Improvement Act. [R.830-840.] They argued that Defendants are entitled to
immunity if they acted ''with respect to deliberations, decisions, or determinations made
or information furnished in good faith and without malice." [R.830.] They further argued
that Defendants are entitled to a presumption of good faith unless Plaintiff can show
malice and bad faith by clear and convincing evidence. [R.831.] Defendants supported
their position with self-serving declarations of the Defendants' subjective intent, and

CD

Because the district court ruled in favor of Defendants on their Motion for Summary
Judgment, the issue of extension oftime for discovery and Plaintiffs Statement of
Discovery Issues were not heard. [R.1216.]
4
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downplayed the manner in which they kept the whole process "shrouded in secrecy" (to
use the words of Judge Stone). [R.833.] They then cited "substantial objective evidence"
they claim demonstrates a lack of bad faith or malice. [R.833-34.] In doing so they gloss
over the extreme delays in providing what little information they did provide to Dr.
Levitt. They downplay the significance and the potential inference of bad faith and
malice of completely withholding information of exactly what errors Dr. Levitt had
committed that would warrant her summary suspension. They do so under the guise of
"protecting the peer review privilege." [R.834.] Finally, they argue that while Dr. Levitt
was not provided the Fair Hearing that she requested, she was instead given the
alternative of completing seven proctored surgeries in a unilaterally compressed time
frame and that this was somehow more beneficial to her than the Fair Hearing would
have been. [R.833-34 & n. 17] They try to claim that this was a bargained for exchange
and that proctorship was somehow better for Dr. Levitt because the Fair Hearing process
would extend beyond the 30 days and require reporting to the NPDB, as stated in a
redacted email introduced by Defendants. [R. 1224-25.] However, a review of some of
the unredacted portions of the email from Dr. Davis to Dr. Levitt shows that Dr. Davis, at
minimum believed he had the power to suspend the tolling of the 28 days of the
suspension and the reporting requirement. But apparently only for Defendants' purposes.
[R.1230.] The fact that they would present an email in redacted form that is one
document from among the documents that they claim are absolutely privileged further
indicates that they are willing to waive the privilege for their own purposes.
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Dr. Levitt opposed the motion, arguing that there were numerous missteps by
Defendants including: delays in communication; denials of requests for even the slightest
bit of information; miscommunications and a runaround as to from whom she might get
information; a summary suspension without the proper notice of her right to a Fair
Hearing as required by the Medical Staff Bylaws; the arbitrary decision to deny her a Fair
Hearing; the demand that she complete a proctorship, only later (in the course of this
litigation) to claim that the proctorship was a better alternative for her with which she had
agreed; and arbitrarily delaying and reducing the time in which she could comply with
the proctoring demand. [R.977-985] However, information as to the nature and
magnitude of errors and the qualifications of reviewers could have easily been provided
without divulging the identity of patients, complainants or reviewers. [R.990.] Instead
Defendants chose to remain silent, or deflect Dr. Levitt's inquiries to others within the
conspiracy. [R.1002-05.] Plaintiff disputed the inferences that Defendants claimed could
be drawn from the "objective evidence." .Under the summary judgment standard Dr.
Levitt is entitled, at this stage of litigation, for all reasonable inferences to be drawn in
her favor, not in favor of Defendants. [R.987.] Indeed, taking all actions or inaction into
consideration as a whole the court could and should infer malice and bad faith. The
Arizona Court of Appeals in Scappatura v. Baptist Hospital of Phoenix, 584 P.2d 1195,
120 I (Ariz. App. 1978), a case relied upon by Defedants, stated, "[ m ]alice and
maliciously import a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person, or an intent to do a
wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law." [R.987.] Significantly,
in each of the cases, relied upon by Defendants in this case, where the requisite malice
19
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was not found, the defendants has followed extensive internal procedures with full
knowledge and participation of the Plaintiffs before taking the adverse actions of which
the Plaintiffs complained. That did not happen in the instant case. [R.986-90.]
On February 7, 2018 the district court held the hearing on all motions including

Gd

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 1055.] The district court granted
summary judgment by Order dated March 2, 2018 on the grounds of immunity under
state law. [R.1064-65.]
In making its ruling during the hearing, the district court acknowledged first that
"the record in this case is a little atypical it's - I think 'shrouded in secrecy' is not a bad

Gw

characterization of that, but that is really by necessity because the legislature has already
made the policy determination that we don't litigate healthcare quality questions in
court ... " [R.124 7.] The court stated that it understood that the parties "have very
different version[s]" of the facts regarding compliance with the Medical Staff Bylaws and
whether proctoring was an appropriate substitute for a Fair Hearing. The court also
stated that it is "problematic" for the court to infere [sic] from those "faults" in the
internal process, and to infere [sic] from "those missteps" malice or lack of good faith.
[R.1247-48.] However, at the summary judgment stage Plaintiff, as the nonmoving party
is entitled to that inference unless such an inference is wholly unreasonable. No such
inferences here were unreasonable.
The court stated that "(o]rdinarily. We look for some sort of extrinsic evidence of
good faith, and we look for cases where we sort out ulterior purpose ... whether the
primary purpose was something impennissible like competitive exclusion, ... [p]ersonal
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enmity, [r]etaliation, [or] [d]iscrimination .... " [R.1248.] The court went on to say,
"[i]nstead, I'm asked to infere [sic] just from the sum total of what plaintiffs [sic]
contends are missteps in the care review process to infere [sic] from that malice .... I can't
do that." [R.1248.] However, the nonmoving party is entitled to just such an inference
unless it is wholly unreasonable.
Finally, the court addresses several "missteps" in isolation and states that he
cannot infer malice from any of them saying: "the conditional reappointment doesn't
strike me as malice, it's reappointment [R.1248-49.] (This ignores the fact that typical
@

reappointment is unconditional and for a period of two years, not six months.); delays in
notifying of reappointment, perhaps it's sloppy, but it doesn't lead to an inference of
malice [R.1249.]; refusal [to provide any information] I have talked about the necessity
for preserving the privilege around protecting healthcare processes [R.1249.]; the
summary suspension, I can't from just that fact of the summary suspension infer ... lack
of good faith or malice [R.1249.]; finally, the proctoring requirements seems more like an
opportunity to seek reinstatement than it is some sort of malicious act or some action
taken in bad faith [R.1249.]. The Court concluded that Dr. Levitt had not met her burden
of showing malice or bad faith and granted summary judgment based on immunity under
state law. [R.1249].

Summary of the Argument
Health care providers enjoy statutory immunity under Utah law only if their
actions are carried out in good faith and without malice. In this case Defendants should
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be denied statutory immunity because their actions taken together illustrate malice and
bad faith. Defendants made adverse decisions concerning Dr. Levitt's hospital privileges
and repeatedly delayed sending notice of these decisions. Defendants repeatedly refused
to provide Dr. Levitt with the reasons for the decisions, and refused to provide any
justification for such refusal. It wasn't until after this case was filed that they cited the
"peer review privilege" as their justification for keeping the entire process "shrouded in
secrecy." Defendants could easily have provided Dr. Levitt with the underlying reasons
for their actions without divulging the identities of the patients, complainants, or
reviewers involved and still "protected the privilege." While maintaining their
conspiracy of silence, Defendants summarily suspended Dr. Levitt's hospital privileges
and demanded that she complete seven proctored cases within the next 28 days, but she
~

could not use the operating room during the first fourteen days of the suspension. The
notice of suspension failed to include the mandatory notice of her right to a Fair Hearing
as required by the Medical Staff Bylaws.
Dr. Davis further complicated matters by arbitrarily delaying her access to the
operating room for an additional week thereafter. The CEO Jeff Frandsen first approved
of Dr. Levitt doing some of the proctored surgeries at other IASIS facilities only to have
Dr. Davis later arbitrarily, and without explanation, deny the inclusion of the two
surgeries she performed at IASIS Lakeview facility among the seven required proctored.
Thus, she was ultimately required to perform nine proctored surgeries. Finally, and
maybe most importantly she requested a Fair Hearing and her request was denied in
direct violation oft.1..e Medical Staff Bylaws.
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When considering summary judgment the district court must resolve all genuinely
disputed facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the
nonmoving party. In this case that was Dr. Levitt. In this case the district court failed to
do so.
Each of the Defendants' missteps, as the district court called them, viewed in
isolation, may not draw an inference of bad faith and malice. But, when viewed
altogether as potentially coordinated efforts which served to vex and frustrate the
professional aspirations and damage the professional reputation of Dr. Levitt, a
reasonable jury could infer bad faith and malice from the totality of the circumstances.
The district court erred as a matter of law when it resolved these factual disputes and the
inferences to be drawn from those facts in favor of the moving parties, the Defendants.
While each "misstep" may seem relatively innocuous in isolation, taken as a whole a
reasonable jury could view the pattern of conduct and draw the inference that Defendants
acted with malice and in bad faith.
Furthermore, the court in making its rulings invaded the province of the jury when
it made a factual determination that a conditional reappointment was arguably a positive
development. The court's statement "the conditional reappointment doesn't strike me as
malice it's reappointment" suggests it did not understand the negative impact on Dr.
Levitt's career and reputation and at this stage of litigation it is Dr. Levitt that is entitled
to any inferences to be drawn from the fact of a conditional reappointment. The court's
claim that "proctoring seems more like an opportunity" is another example of not
understanding the situation and the burden such a requirement placed on Dr. Levitt.
23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Stating that it "seems more like an opportunity" invades the province of the fact finder as
well, because its Dr. Levitt that is entitled to a negative inference, not the "opportunity"
that seemed to be to the district court. This is especially true when proctoring is not
mentioned in the Medical Staff Bylaws as a substitute for a Fair Hearing.
This Court should reverse the ruling of the district court and remand for further
proceedings including an Order for Defendants to produce redacted copies of documents
or in camera review of allegedly privileged documents so that there may be a full and fair
trial on the merits of this case.
ii

Argument
This case has proven problematic since Defendants began hiding behind the peer
review statute to prevent Dr. Levitt from obtaining the very records and documents that

~

would shed light on the procedures (or lack thereof) that the Defendants followed in
taking adverse actions against her. Defendants first raised the issue of privilege on June
23, 2017. Significantly, Defendants never mentioned any privilege to Dr. Levitt in 2011
or 2012 when the events that gave rise to this case were occurring.
In the overall context of this case, if you consider that the causes of action arose in

~

2011 and early 2012, their "privilege" defense is relatively new. It was first raised on
June 23, 2017 to classify as protected, documents included in Dr. Levitt's initial

~

disclosures that Defendants had received on July 8, 2016 nearly a year earlier. [R.55-56,
1258-61.] Since then Defendants have used the "protection of the peer review privilege"
to explain away their unconscionable refusals to provide any information to Dr. Levitt as
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to what, if anything, she had done wrong. [R.829, 847,1222.] Apparently, this
~

explanation struck a chord with the district court. The court acknowledged that the case
could be characterized as containing a "shroud of secrecy." [R.1247.] The court then
accepted the Defendants' explanation of the secrecy to "preserve the peer review
privilege." [R.1248.] This is a post hoc justification, not the reason for their secrecy.
Throughout these proceedings, however, Defendants have failed to acknowledge that
they could have told Dr. Levitt what she had done wrong, and why she was subject to
their adverse actions without divulging the identity of patients or others who provided
them with information. Documents including privileged information are routinely put
before factfinders, with the protected information redacted. (Defendants themselves
presented to the court, in the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, a redacted email
from Dr. Davis to Dr. Levitt that purported to show that she somehow tacitly agreed to
the proctorship as an alternative to her contractual right to a Fair Hearing, while
steadfastly maintaining it was a privileged document. [R.1224-25.]) It is the identities of
patients, complainants, or reviewers, not the substance of complaints that is intended for
protection, especially in this context where it is the physician who's conduct is under
review who is seeking the information. Interestingly, Defendants repeatedly claim that
the silence was to "protect the privilege" but the single bit of information they ultimately
did provide, even though it was late in the process, was a list of patient names, arguably
among the most sensitive and protected information they could provide. [R.829, 847,
1222, 1248]
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Because of the manner in which the district court ruled this dismissal on summary
judgment boiled down to one issue: that health care providers enjoy statutory immunity
under Utah Code Ann. §58-13-4 only if their actions are carried out "in good faith and
without malice.'' Id In their supporting memorandum in the court below, Defendants

claim ''the weight of Utah authority 'grants deference to hospital officials' professional
judgment' for corrective actions affecting hospital staff' and they go on to discuss two
cases. 5 [R.830-31.] Interestingly, neither case addresses the statutory immunity
argument. In both cases the courts address contractual immunity under the hospital
bylaws and/or applying contractual fair process provisions. [R.986-87 .] Significantly, in

Don Houston the hospital engaged in extensive review procedures and Dr. Houston was
kept fully informed on an ongoing basis of the reasons for, and the results of ,the reviews
over a period of more than two years before he was summarily suspended. 933 P.2d at
404-405. [R.986.] Defendants also cited Scappatura v. Baptist Hospital ofPhoenix, 584
P.2d 1195 (Ariz. App. 1978). The court there ruled that plaintiff doctor had not proven
malice. But circumstances were very different from the instant case. The plaintiffs
privileges has been temporarily suspended, pending a full investigation, as the result of
numerous complaints concerning a patient who expired shortly after surgery. Id. at 1197.
After a full hearing, [the plaintiffs] privileges were reinstated. Id. at 1198. The
defendants explicitly stated the reasons for the suspension. Finally, "[l]ess than one
month after his suspension [plaintiff] was reinstated with certain restrictions and

Don Houston, MD, Inc. v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 933 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) and Brinton v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 973 P .2d 956, 964 (Utah 1998).
5
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conditions, through a series of formal hearings, all of which comported with due process
standards." Id. at 1199. [R.987-88.] None of these procedural safeguards, guaranteed by
the Medical Staff Bylaws were provided to Dr. Levitt in this case. That said this case, at
this point boils down to the issue of whether Dr. Levitt has shown a genuine issue of
material fact.

I. On Motion for Summary Judgment the Court Failed to Construe All Facts and
the Reasonable Inferences to be Drawn Therefrom in Favor of Dr. Levitt
In deciding a motion for summary judgment the district court must construe all
facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of Plaintiff as the nonmoving party. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,859 (Utah 1983). "Summary
judgment is appropriate only upon a showing 'that there is no genuine issue as to any
~

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."'
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054, 1060 (Utah 2002). To defeat

summary judgment Plaintiff need only present evidence that is sufficient to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1063. [R.977.]
A. Dr. Levitt Has Presented Sufficient Evidence to Establish Several Genuine Issues of
Material Fact

This case is replete with disputes of fact and disputes regarding the inferences that
can and should be drawn from otherwise objective evidence. Defendants made adverse
decisions concerning Dr. Levitt's hospital privileges and repeatedly delayed sending
notice of these decisions. Defendants repeatedly refused to provide Dr. Levitt with the
reasons for the decisions, and refused to provide any justification for such refusal. It
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wasn't until after this case was filed that they cited the "peer review privilege" as their
justification for keeping the entire process "shrouded in secrecy." Defendants could
easily have provided Dr. Levitt with the underlying reasons for their actions without
divulging the identities of the patients, complainants, or reviewers involved and still
"protected the privilege." While maintaining their conspiracy of silence, Defendants
summarily suspended Dr. Levitt's hospital privileges and demanded that she complete
seven proctored cases within the next 28 days, but she could not use the operating room
during the first fourteen days of the suspension. The notice of suspension failed to
include notice of her right to a Fair Hearing as required by the Medical Staff Bylaws.

~

Then Dr. Davis further complicated matters by arbitrarily delaying her access to the
operating room for an additional week thereafter. The CEO Jeff Frandsen first approved
of Dr. Levitt doing some of the proctored surgeries at other IASIS facilities only to have
Dr. Davis later arbitrarily, and without explanation, deny the inclusion of the two
surgeries she performed at the IASIS Lakeview facility among the seven required
proctored. Thus, she was ultimately required to perform nine proctored surgeries.
Finally, and maybe most importantly, she requested a Fair Hearing and her request was
denied in direct violation of the Medical Staff Bylaws. The failure to provide the notice
of right to a Fair Hearing, and the failure to provide the requested Fair Hearing, both in
~

direct violation of the Medical Staff Bylaws, render any claimed efforts to conduct a peer
review nothing but a sham. 6 This is because with statutory privileges being invoked to

In their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Defendant cited an article by Dinesh
Vyas & Ahmed E. Hozain entitled Clinical Peer Review in the United States to explain

6
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hide information, Dr. Levitt's only true defense to her reputation was through the Fair
Hearing procedures.
The district court characterized the Defendants actions as "those faults",
"missteps'' and "sloppy." [K.1247-1249.] The court explains away the secrecy
surrounding the entire affair as "preserving the peer review privilege." If indeed that was
the reason in 2011 and early 2012, why was that reason never expressed until June 23,
2017, nearly a year after the July 8, 2016 date upon which Plaintiffs initial disclosures
were submitted? The court refused to infer malice or bad faith from the "conditional
reappointment" because it viewed reappointment, at least in part, as a good thing. Dr.
Levitt disputes that such conditional reappoint was in any way a positive and at this stage
of litigation she is entitled to the negative inference. Dr. Levitt is entitled to the inference
that the undisputed significant delays in communication (46 days and at least 11 days) are
more than sloppy, they harmed her, and some form of bad faith could be inferred from
them. At this stage of litigation, Dr. Levitt is entitled to an inference of bad faith
regarding her summary suspension without any communicated justification. Finally, the
court improperly decided that the fact of the proctorship "seems" more like an
opportunity than a detriment. Again, at this stage of this litigation, Dr. Levitt is entitled
to her view that being forced to perform a total of nine proctored surgeries to satisfy a

~

the "critical public policies" in which immunity is anchored. [R.1283 n.2] However, that
same article points out that blanket immunity has given rise to abuses in the form of
"sham peer reviews." The article calls for much needed standardization of peer review
processes, external reviews and legislative reform. Dinesh Vyas & Ahmed E. Hozain,
Clinical Peer Review in the United States, History, Legal Development, and Subsequent
Abuse, World J. Gastroenterology, v. 20(21); 2014 Jun 7.
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requirement of seven surgeries within 28 days (ultimately reduced to 7 days) was a
serious detriment and professional hardship. Given each and every inference that Dr.
Levitt was entitled to and was denied; if those inferences are viewed in her favor a
reasonable jury could decide that there was clear and convincing evidence of bad faith

~

and malice because taken as a whole there is no other more likely explanation.

Conclusion
This Court should hold that Dr. Levitt has presented sufficient evidence
establishing several material issues of material fact as to the events and circumstances
surrounding her suspension. Those material issues of fact improperly decided by the trial

~

court here, requires that this Court reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand
this case with instruction to conclude discover and set this matter for trial before a jury.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2018.

Isl Cecil R. Hedger

Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant

~
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Utah Code

58-13-4 Liability immunity for health care providers on committees - Evaluating and
approving medical care.
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same meaning as in Section 788-3-403.
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and the organizations or entities
sponsoring these activities are immune from liability with respect to deliberations, decisions, or
determinations made or infonnation furnished in good faith and without malice:
(a) serving on committees:
(i) established to determine if hospitals and long-term care facilities are being used properly;
(ii) established to evaluate and improve the quality of health care or determine whether
provided health care was necessary, appropriate, properly performed, or provided at a
reasonable cost;
(iii) functioning under Pub. L. No. 89-97 or as professional standards review organizations
under Pub. L. No. 92-603;
(iv) that are ethical standards review committees; or
(v) that are similar to committees listed in this Subsection (2) and that are established by any
hospital, professional association, the Utah Medical Association, or one of its component
medical societies to evaluate or review the diagnosis or treatment of, or the performance of
health or hospital services to, patients within this state;
(b) members of licensing boards established under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, to
license and regulate health care providers; and
(c) health care providers or other persons furnishing information to those committees, as required
by law, voluntarily, or upon official request.
(3) This section does not relieve any health care provider from liability incurred in providing
professional care and treatment to any patient.
(4) Health care providers serving on committees or providing information described in this section
are presumed to have acted in good faith and without malice, absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.

Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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The Order of the Court is stated below: / . . / -~ f/: ·'. \
Dated: March 02, 2018
Isl AND~W:J~I.[ONS

District~co1itfJudge /

02:45:39 PM

-...;~~~~; l ;: \
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Jonathan A. Dibble (0881)
Elaina M. Maragakis (7929)
Erin M. Adams (15979)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

36 South State Street, Suite 1400

P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (80 I) 532-1500
Fax: (801) 532-7543
idibble@rqn.com
emaragakis@rgn.com

eadams(@,rgn.com
Attorneys for Defendants IASIS Healthcare Holdings, Inc., Salt Lake Regional Medical Center,
Alan Davis, MD. and Wanda Updike. M.D.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JODIE K. LEVITT, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
V.

ORDER
Case No. 160900952

IASIS HEALTH CARE HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; SALT LAKE REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, LP, a Delaware Limited
Partnership, DBA Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center; ALAN DAVIS~ M.D., WANDA UPDIKE,
M.S.; and DOES 1-10,

Judge Andrew H. Stone
Tier Ill

Defendants.

The Court, having reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion") submitted
by Defendants IASIS Healthcare, Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Alan Davis, M.D. and
Wanda Updike, M.D. (collectively, the "Defendants"), the Defendants' Memorandum in Support
of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion
for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs Declaration, and the Defendants' Reply Memorandum in

March 02, 2018 02:45 PM
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Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment and all exhibits attached to all the papers filed and
having heard oral argument by a11 parties on February 7, 2018, and being fully infonned, hereby
GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, and finds
as follows:

Defendants have properly invoked the peer and care review privileges.

2.

There is no evidence that Defendants acted from any motive other than healthcare

quality improvement and concern for patient care.
3.

Plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption of good faith and lack of malice under

Utah Code Ann. §58-13-4.
4.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants are immune from Plaintiff's claims.

5.

All of Plaintiff's claims are dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice.

Gllii

*

* *

END OF ORDER

*

*

*

**In accordance with URCP Rule JO(e) and the Utah State District courts E-filing Standard No. 4,
this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic
signature at the upper right-hand comer of the first page of this Order.**

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 20, 2018, I emailed the foregoing [Proposed] Order to:
Cecil R. Hedger, Esq.
chedger(@tessorolaw.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
Whereas Plaintiff gave no response and made no objection within seven days~ we now file the
foregoing [Proposed) Order pursuant to Rule 7G)(5)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Isl Erin M Adams

March 02. 2018 02:45 PM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2 of 2

AddendumC

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(i.)

. . . ~.

•:·
~!

i

SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
November 23: 201 ~

Jo<lie K Levitt, MD
82 South 1100 East
Suite 303
Salt Lake City, UT 84 l 02

Re: Reappointment to the Medical Staff

Dear Dr. Levitt:
On behalf of the Board of Trustees, I wish to infonn you that your reappointment to the Active MedicaJ
Staff of Salt Lake Regional Medical Center and renewal of privileges in Neurost1rgery have been
approved. As JOH /urve severalpeer n:viem pi!lldillg, it is tlteir recommendatio11 that _,;ou be. approved
for a six-month conditiottlll u.appoinlmi!ut in order that the)' migllt review their dispositions in a more
timely mmmer. Also, the Credentials Committee has requestedfurtlier darificatioll 011 .vour

llospilafk,ation in tlze last five years and medications tlud you might ha ·1aliing tlzot 1nay affect altl1er
Your medical staff period is for 09/29/2011 to 03/29/2012.

your clinical judgment or motor skills.

The reappointment is subject to all the tenns and conditions of your initial appointment and previous
reappoinancnts~ and the Bylaws, Rules and Regulations, and Policies of the Hospital and )l]edical Staff in
force during the term of your appointment

The clinical privileges were granted as requested.

We hope for a continued strong relationship with you and the community we serve.
Sincerely.

.

a5ren

; - - ~

Chief Executive Officer

JF/mj

Enclosure

1050 East South Temple, Salt Lake City. Uta.l, 84102

T: &01.350.4717

F: 80\.350.4571
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CERTIFIED :M...t\IL
Retum Receipt Requested

Jodie Levitt. MD
82 South 1100 East. Suite 303

..

Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

@

;·

Dear Dr. Levitt

.

\ ,,: ....

,c<\

<\.·:

\.·
·._\,

'

The Credentials Committee met recently and reviewed your file, as the end of your six month conditio.oal
reappointment is comiD.g up in.March 2012. We reviewed the six cases that were sent out to ail ~em.al
reviewer and two other recent occwrences 1hat are pending review. The Credentials Committee requests
the following for continuation of your privileges at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center:
J • Review of your ceses find there have been several CSF Jea.1<.s in the last few years. Therefore.,. we

recommend that you establish e. written protocol for handling CSF leaks mthe future. You need to
submit this in writing to the Medical Staff Office by March I. 20 J2.

2. Re\iew of your cases finds that you have had three wrong site surgeries in the last few years. We
recommend that you have a uTitten protocol as to how you wiU e:.'"'tablish confirmation of correct site
surgery in 1he operating room. The Committee feels these are serious e'VentS and if another wrong
site oocurrence happens, the Committee will discuss further action which could include termination of
privileges. Please submit mis in writing to the Medical Staff Office by March!, 2012.
3.

Review of your ~pointmem: appl:cation finds there was an omission of your hospita.li~on i~----November 2009. The Credentials Committee takes errorsiomissions in applications very seriously.
Even though you have disclosed information to the CEO. this information needs to be documented in
your reappointment application in order for the Credentials Committee to have consistent and current
information. The CEO is not a member of the Credentials Committee. Please correct the appliccrJon

by Maroh l.2012 and submit it to the Medical Staff Office.
Assuming you Te;i.i)Ond in a satisfactory and timely manner to the requests descn'"bed above~ the
Credentials Committee will approve a three-month conditional reappointment. During this time the

Credentials Committee will be reviewing your cases in a concurrent fashion.
If you have any questions regarding these items, you are welcome to make an appointment to meet with
the Credentials Committee.

;mj
1050 East South TemDle. Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

T: 801.350.4717

F: 801.350.4571
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,Jef£ Fran.cl.sen, CEO

February 15, 2012

Dear Dr. Levitt
Per the meeting with yourself, Jeff Frandsen, CEO, Dr. Alan Davis, and Dr. Wanda Updike on
Wednesday, February 14, 2012, regarding your privileges al Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center and the actions taken by the Medical Executive Committee; the following is a

summary of those actions and requests:
I. 28-day suspension of your privileges to practice at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
(both surgically and medically)
2. The minimum length of the suspension period, should y-0u meet the following crit~
will remain at least 14 days beginning February 15. 2012. However, this timeframe will
be at the sole discretion of the Chief of Staff and CEO. collectively.
3. Below are the criteria requested by the Executive Committee:
a. Submit a proctoring plan to the Chief of Staf[ which is to include:
I.

Proctoring by a neurosu~eon only

ii. Proctoring of one lumbar case
111.

Proctoring of one cervical case

iv. Proctoring of four other cases ~o be proposed by you and approved by the
Chief of Staff that would pertain to the areas of clinical or procedural

concern as discussed wilh you in th:s meeting.
v. Reapply for privileges as outlined by 1he Credentials Committee letter

Gli

dated January 30, 2012, which bas been given to you. This letter was

signed by Dr. Richard Kielsen, Committee Chainnao
vi. Fully comply ·with all of the requests of the aforementioned Credentials
Committee letter (Section 3.v.)

vu. Submit with signatme, documentation ofn back-up coverage plan should
you be out of town or otherwise become unable to care for your patients
who may present thcmsc!Ycs to Salt Lake Regional ~•1edical Center for
services.

~

4. Privileges will be reinstated upon completion of all criteria noted herein. However, the

Medical Executive Committee and Administmion reserve the right to talce further or
alternative steps based upon discovery of additional concerns or proactive and positive
remediation of identified needs for improvement regarding your ability to provide
high-quality patient care.

.-.:hi:,h:rc.:g:~,n::i. :.:,,,.

--..

9£SS-LLc.- ~OS

•--'

·- ,-- ------·--
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Jodie Leviu
February 15. 2012

5. During the period of suspension, your patients who present for care at Salt Lake Regionai
Medical Center will need to be referred to another medical professional on call for that
care. Jf there is not a medical professional avai Iable to ap~ropriately care for your
patient~ the patient will likely need to be transferred to another facility (whµc maintaining
the strictest of compliance to EMTALA Jaws).
·

Should you have any other questions or requests as to terms and conditions ot your
suspension herein defined, please contact Dr. Alan Davis, Salt Lake Regiona1 Medical
Center Chief of Staff. The contents of this letter represent (but are not exclusive of) the
direction of Salt Lake regional Medical Center's Medical Executive Committee and

Administration.
Thank you Dr-Levitt. We sjncerely hope for your success as you move forward.
Sincerely,

Alan Davis M.D.

Wanda Updike, M.D.

Jodie Levitt, M.D.
(Please sign as an acknowledgement of acceptance cf these terms)
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FDR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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)
)
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) Case No. 160900952

vs.

)

) Transcript of:
IASIS HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS INC.,

)
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________________
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February 7, 2018

2

PROCEEDINGS

3

* * *

4

5

THE COURT:

All right.

Good afternoon.

No. 160900952, Levitt v. Iasis Healthcare Holdings, Inc.

6

Could I have appearances, please.

7

MR. HEDGER:

8
9

This is Case

Cecil Hedger, Your Honor, for plaintiff.

Plaintiff is also with me at counsel table.

MR. DIBBLE:

Your Honor, Jonathan Dibble,

10

Elaina Maragakis, and Erin Adams representing Iasis, Salt Lake

11

Regional Medical Center, Dr. Alan Davis, and Dr. Wanda Updike.

12

TBE COURT:

Okay.

We're here today on defendants'

13

motion for summary judgment, and then a motion regarding

14

extension of discovery as well.

15

MR. DIBBLE:

Is that correct?

That's correct, Your Honor.

And our

16

thought was that you may want to hear the motion for summary

17

judgment first because that may dispose of the other, possibly.

18

19

TBE COURT:

I think that's correct.

MS. MARAGAKIS:

21

you again for your time.
THE COURT:

Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Well, shoot.

I should also apologize to

everyone for having to bump this hearing too.

24

unfortunately, had double-booked at one point.
MS. MARAGAKJ:S:

We thank

I know, Your Honor

23

25

So let's hear

the motion for summary judgment for starters.

20

22

ii

I,

Well, I would think you would be able
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1

On February 20 --

2

MR. HEDGER:

Uh -- Counsel, I am sorry.

3

a chance to respond.

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. MARAGAKIS:

I

will have

I apologize to Counsel and to the Court.
All right.

Thank you.

On February 24th there was a meeting

6

that took place and at that point it was a meeting between two

7

of the defendants, Dr. Davis, Dr. Updike, who were then the

8

current and former chairs of the medical executive committee,

9

or MEC, as well as Jeff Franzen, who was the then CEO and

10

Dr. Levitt.

And at that point, she was allowed to see what

11

Dr. Levitt characterized as a cursory list of the cases giving

12

rise to the suspension.

13

was called in to meet at that point prior to her suspension.

14

And finally, there was a list of cases provided to

And the important thing is is that she

15

her.

They contend it was after March 16, 2012, but in any

16

event, to say that there was no notice or that there -- you

17

know, she had absolutely no idea of any of the reasons for her

18

suspension, is just belied by all of the contents of these

19

letters and the February 24th meeting as well.
I will also note, Your Honor, that the defendants

20
21

never reported Dr. Levitt to the National Practitioner

22

Databank.

23

there was no -- nothing on her NPDB record.

24

suspension was lifted upon successful completion of her

25

proctorship and so -- that's where she continues to this day.

The suspension did not last longer than 30 days, so

Noteworthy Reporting
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9

1

action is taken and the reasonable belief that the action was

2

in furtherance of quality healthcarP..

3

Honor, I will just submit to you the same facts that I just

4

recited to you, namely that these peer reviews were pending,

5

there were -- they were elevated at some point to outside peer

6

review and, obviously, there is an abundance of evidence that

7

there was potential -- there were potential issues that could

8

impact quality healthcare.

9

On that point, Your

The second point is after a reasonable effort to

10

obtain the facts of the matter, again, we did invite additional

11

responses, which doctor -- which Dr. Levitt did provide.

12

after adequate notice hearing procedures are afforded to the

13

position involved or after such other procedures as are fair to

14

the physician under the circumstances.

And

This has been a bit of point of contention by the

15
16

plaintiff, but, Your Honor, I just underscore the fact that as

17

many of these cases -- as is the case with many of these cases,

18

it was simply resolved by the fact that she accepted and

19

completed this proctorship.

20

say, "Well, she didn't really accept it," but the fact of the

21

matter is:

22

completed it and her suspension was lifted.

23

4w

Now I know that the plaintiff will

She did accept the proctorship because she

~

If there is some sort of dispute about whether that

24

was accepted, I suppose the suspension would still be in place.

25

So I don't think that there is any reasonable argument that
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1

somehow she was entitled to a fair hearing when she proceeded

2

with the option of the proctorship and I think that's important

3

to note.

4

I also will note, Your Honor, there has been an

5

allegation by the plaintiff that she was denied the opportunity

6

for a fair hearing.

7

of an email to and -- to Dr. Davis and -- from Dr. Davis and we

8

have attached it in redacted form, but I will just note, Your

9

Honor, that in that email Dr. Davis specifically talks about if

And the plaintiff actually attached a copy

10

you want to have a hearing, you are going to have to request

11

that by March -- I think it was March 16th -- it won't occur

12

prior to -- prior to the 30 days.

13

THE COURT:

Arn

I correct in reading that chain that

14

there was a response from the doctor March 8th from doctor

15

[inaudible].

16

17

MS. MARAGAKIS:

issue of whether she wanted to request a fairing hearing.
THE COURT:

18

19
20

So there was not a response on the

No, it was just more thank you, as I

recall.
MS. MARAGAKIS:

Yes.

But there was never any

21

response to that, no "I want to go through with my fair

22

hearing, I want to clear my name,'' nothing further at least is

23

indicated by that -- by that --

24
25

THE COURT:

I'm just trying to date when the offer

for a hearing was made, and so it was made shortly before
Noteworthy Reporting
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1
2

MR. HEDGER:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HEDGER:

May I approach?
Yes.
I think it's important for the Court to

5

read the entirety of this email to allow the rest of my

6

argument concerning both the state's statute and the federal

7

statute with respect to what we're dealing with here.
Okay.

8

9

~

only receiving it for purposes of making that determination.

Your Honor, Dr. Davis indicates "it will only

count as 28 days in extending a deadline with respect to the
~

10

suspension," meaning that could he have, at any point in time

11

prior to my client's slip-and-fall in the operating room, which

12

caused the extension and sometime on the 4th, 5th, or 6th of

13

March, my client fell and suffered a concussion in the

14

operating room, which triggered the reference here to extending

15

this thing for another week.

16

~

I will have the ability this -- email says and stands

17

for, to extend or to hold or to determine when the 28 days

18

starts or counts or whatever.

19

reason:

20

to -- in February, prior to her slip-and-fall in the operation

21

room.

22

And that's important for this

It's because my client asked for a fair hearing prior

Dr. Davis told her no.
And then in his affidavit, Your Honor, that's

23

Exhibit-1 to their motion, he says that he told my client,

24

which my client denies, that if you have a fair hearing, it's

25

going to extend the suspension and cause problems with the
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1

THE COURT:

2

MS. MARAGAKIS:

3

THE COURT:

No, thanks.
Thank you.

Well, first of all, I mean, I think I

4

should acknowledge the record in this case is little atypical

5

it's -- I think "shrouded in secrecy" is not a bad

6

characterization of that, but that is really by necessity

7

because the legislature has already made the policy

8

determination that we don't litigate healthcare quality

9

questions in court and we permit healthcare entities to collect

10

data about healthcare quality and take actions about healthcare

11

quality without subjecting that documentation to even discovery

12

in court.

13

when we start talking about suspension of privileges, but

14

that's by design, that's what the legislature intends.

And that makes these cases peculiarly challenging

15

I understand that plaintiff takes issue with some of

16

the substantive decisions and some of the procedures that were

17

undertaken in her case with the hospital.

18

there is a dispute about whether the hospital substantively

19

complied about the bylaws, whether the plaintiff

20

was -- requested a hearing and was provided an opportunity for

21

that hearing or whether that was denied.

22

that.

23

process, I understand the parties have very different version

24

of.

25

those faults that the plaintiff takes with the internal

I understand that

I understand all of

The whole issue of proctoring versus the hearing

But it really is problematic for the Court to infere from
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1

process, all of which no one has disputed really to healthcare

2

quality improvement and to infere from those missteps the

3

failure, for example, to provide a hearing, malice or lack of

4

good faith.

5

Ordinarily, we look for some sort of extrinsic

6

evidence of good faith, and we look for cases where we sort out

7

an ulterior purpose from healthcare improvement and the

8

challenges that decide whether the primary purpose was

9

something impermissible like competitive exclusion, no evidence

10

of that in this case.

11

at all in this case.

12

suggests any retaliatory motive.

13

improper purpose, nothing discussed in the testimony about

14

this.

15

Personal enmity, no testimony about that
Retaliation, nothing in this case
Discrimination on some

Instead, I'm asked to infere just from the sum total

16

of what plaintiffs contends are missteps in the care review

17

process to infere from that malice.

18

or lack of good faith by clear and convincing evidence it would

19

overcome a presumption, a statutory presumption of good faith

20

and lack of malice.

21

And not only that malice

I can't do that.

When I -- when I look at this record and I've looked

22

thoroughly at all of plaintiff's theories, the secrecy

23

surrounding the collection of ten cases for peer review, there

24

is a simple explanation for that secrecy, is to preserve the

25

peer review privilege.

The conditional reappointment doesn't
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1

strike me as malice, it's reappointment.

2

notifying of reappointment -- of the conditional reappointment,

3

perhaps it's sloppy, but it doesn't lead to an inference of

4

malice.

5

The delays in

The refusal discussed, again, I have talked about the

6

necessity for preserving the privilege around protecting

7

healthcare processes within the entity.

8

suspension, I am -- you know, the parties have danced around

9

the reason for that, I understand the reasons that, but I can't

The summary

10

from just the fact of the summary suspension infer from that

11

that there is some lack of good faith or malice.

12

The proctoring requirements seems more like an

13

opportunity to seek reinstatement than it is some sort of

14

malicious act or some act taken in bad faith and that's borne

15

out by the fact that Dr. Levitt's privileges were ultimately

16

reinstated.

17

So based on all of that, I have conclude that

18

plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in rebutting the

19

presumption of good faith and lack of malice and therefore all

20

of the actions complained of within the complaint are subject

21

to the immunity under the state law.

22

subjects them to the immunity granted in the bylaw, but I don't

23

reach that.

24

law immunity applies and summary judgment should be granted.

25

I think it probably also

I think it is sufficient simply to say that state

Ask Ms. Maragakis to prepare an order.
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